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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Furthermore, such abdication ultimately involves the Court in many
more policy judgments than would an adherence to the so-called
"activist" or "absolutist" position. Thus, it is submitted that the bal-
ancing of rights protected by the Constitution sends the Court down
the exact path that Professor Mendelson finds Justice Black traveling.
Of course, the Court cannot avoid the balancing process in defining
what is protected-e. g., speech. I believe, however, that potential
judicial meddling is at a low ebb when the Court goes through the
balancing process in defining liberty and that the interest demonstrated
by the Founding Fathers in the individual's protection is more certain
to be followed in this manner.10
Justices Black and Frankfurter is rather one-sided in its treatment
of the issues and personalities that divide the Court today. For Pro-
fessor Mendelson there are no in-betweens. The uninitiated reader is
led to the inescapable conclusion that a great struggle between truth
and error is proceeding. This review has, I think, made clear who,
according to the author, possesses the truth.
I believe that this book is in the nature of a brief rather than a
study and, as such, I cannot recommend it to the serious student of
constitutional law.
WILLIAM B. GOULD
PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT. By
Frederick M. Rowe. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1962. Pp.
xxx, 675. $22.50.
This book, published in The Trade Regulation Series and edited by
S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, the distinguished scholar of Michigan
University, represents a major contribution to the Series and to anti-
trust literature in general. Written by a practising attorney highly
experienced in the field, it is destined to remain a most useful tool for
lawyers concerned with the perplexing problems of the Robinson-
Patman Act.
Among the chief virtues of the book are depth of analysis, com-
pleteness of material and clarity of expression. Separate chapters are
devoted to each provision of the Act, which is dissected in the light
of its legislative history, economic significance and pertinent adjudica-
tions of the F.T.C. and the Courts.
Born as an effort by grocery wholesalers to curb the aggressive ex-
pansion of the A. & P. Tea Co., the Robinson-Patman Act was given
10. See Charles Black, Mr. Justice Black, The Supreme Court and the Bill of
Rights, Harper's Magazine, Feb. 1961, p. 63.
I Assistant General Counsel, United Auto Workers AFL-CIO.
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antitrust respectability by transforming it into an amendment of the
Clayton Act. The author does not share the views of those who praise
the Robinson-Patman Act as the Magna Carta of small business, fight-
ing against economic giants, but regards the Act as "a product of the
economic crisis of the thirties, with its pessimistic outlook for com-
petitive enterprise."' He challenges the effectiveness of the Act in the
attainment of its avowed goals. On the one hand, Rowe points out
that the share of the total retail business held by retail chain stores is
not appreciably different in 1960 than it was in 1929. On the other
hand, smaller concerns have been victimized by the administration of
the Act; for instance, Section 2 (c), the brokerage clause, has been
expansively applied to impede cost-cutting forms of distribution.
The only unanimity among writers, the F.T.C. and courts is found
in the recognition that the Act is characterized by "elusive uncer-
tainty" and lacks reliable guideposts to insure safety of compliance.
As Mr. Justice Jackson pointedly remarked, construction of the Act
is troublesome for the Court once a term, but for the businessman it
is "trouble ... every day." 2 Hence, few will quarrel with the author's
conclusion that the Act "never mustered sufficient respectability in the
business world to ensure effective self-policing.' 3
Throughout the treatise, two recurrent refrains reassert themselves
in connection with the analysis of the specific provisions of the Act.
One is the inherent conflict in the underlying economic philosophies of
Robinson-Patman with those of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The
other is the criticism of the F.T.C.'s enforcement policies leading to
price rigidities which would sharpen rather than lessen that basic
conflict. Thus, the critical function of reconciliation is devolved upon
the Supreme Court, which time and again halted the Agency's efforts
to expand Robinson-Patman principles at the cost of a corresponding
contraction of traditional antitrust concepts.
The basic tenet of antitrust legislation is the protection of compe-
tition in the interest of the consuming public. The essence of com-
petition being the contest between sellers for the business of buyers,
it seems hardly consistent to make underselling illegal. If identical
pricing may violate the Sherman Act and price differentials violate
the Robinson-Patman Act, an economic dilemma is coupled with dan-
gerous legal inconsistency. Price reduction to meet competition is
sheer self-defense, and therefore basic to the survival of competition.
1. P. 534. [References are to pages of PRiCE DIscRIMINATION UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT.]
2. Transcript of Oral Argument, p. 88, Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 340 U.S. 231
(1951); cited in Rowe at xi, n. 10.
3. P. 550.
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Yet without the chrism of the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v.
F.T.C.,4 this essential competitive practice would have been outlawed
by the F.T.C.
Two years later the clash in the underlying economic theories of the
two Acts again reached the Supreme Court in Automatic CanteenY
Warning against enforcement policies of Robinson-Patman which
would lead to "price uniformity and rigidity in open conflict with the
purposes of other antitrust legislation,"' the Supreme Court found a
"duty to reconcile ' 7 Robinson-Patman with the traditional antitrust
policies expressed by Congress.
While the F.T.C.'s effort to expand the burden of the buyer under
Section 2 (f) was halted in Automatic Canteen, the F.T.C. fared better
in the 1960 Brock decision,8 where the Supreme Court upheld the
agency's construction of Section 2(c) to outlaw payments by inde-
pendent brokers of the seller. The Court's condemnation of a reduction
in brokerage fee to obtain a particular contract is scored by the author
as freezing brokerage commissions at artificially high levels in de-
struction of competition.
Further criticism is directed at the F.T.C.'s illogical distinction in
making the "meeting competition" defense available to a supplier's
discriminatory furnishing of promotional services or facilities under
Section 2 (e), but not to the supplier's disproportionate payments to a
customer for the same promotional services or facilities under Section
2(d). Invalidated by a Court of Appeals, this doctrine is now aban-
doned by the F.T.C. in a ruling made after Rowe's book was published.0
The enforcement policies and the record of the F.T.C.'s administra-
tion of the Robinson-Patman Act in the quarter of a century of its
existence are brought into sharp focus in what is probably the most
provocative chapter of the book. There statistical data are used to
evaluate various facets of the F.T.C.'s work, and to develop, as a
striking illustration, the Parkinson's Law of F.T.C. enforcement. In
Rowe's felicitous expression, "Robinson-Patman proceedings prolifer-
ate with the ease of making a case."' 0 Evidence are the 175 complaints
brought under Section 2(d) in the period 1956 - 1961, compared with
the 19 proceedings instituted under Section 2 (e) in the same period.
Rowe's criticism has already provoked the written retort of at least
one former F.T.C. chairman, who attributes responsibility for some
4. 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
5. Automatic Canteen Co. v. F.T.C., 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
6. Id. at 63.
7. Id. at 74.
8. Henry Broch & Co. v. F.T.C., 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
9. F.T.C. v. Max Factor & Co., No. 7717, ct of decision Nov. 2, 1962.
10. P. 539.
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of the "erratic and inconsistent" policies of the F.T.C. to its being
"buffeted by cross-currents flowing from the legislative, executive and
judicial branches."'" Perhaps the ultimate responsibility for the un-
certainties of the administration of the Act and inconsistencies of
F.T.C. policies may be traced primarily to the inherent vices of the
Act. As the author himself concludes:
Congress never resolved the latent contradictions of protecting
a particular business class from the competitive inroads of modern
marketing methods while professing to promote the process of
competition. The mixed marriage between antitrust and NRA
gave the Act a split legal personality from its inception. 2
PAUL B. RAVAt
11. Howrey, Book Review, 48 A.B.A.J. 760, 761 (1962).
12. P. 534.
t Partner, Lashly, Lashly & Miller.
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